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Casenotes
Moran v. Burbine: Supreme Court Tolerates
Police Interference With the Attorney-Client
Relationship
I.

INTRODUCTION

The right to counsel is a fundamental component of our adversarial system of justice. A criminal defendant's right to the assistance of counsel for the preparation and presentation of his or her
defense is constitutionally recognized. For example, under the
Supreme Court's interpretations of the sixth amendment, criminal
defendants have a right to the presence of counsel during interrogations conducted after the first formal charging proceeding.' The
Court also has held that the fifth amendment privilege against
compelled self-incrimination implies a right to counsel. 2 The fifth
amendment right exists during all custodial interrogations,
whether or not charges have been filed.3 If police fail to honor a
suspect's exercise of his right to counsel under either the fifth or
sixth amendment, and thereafter obtain a confession, that confession may not be admitted into evidence at trial.4
Despite the Court's recognition of the importance of counsel's
presence during interrogation, the Court, in Moran v. Burbine,5
approved the admission of a confession into evidence though the
police had failed to inform the defendant of his attorney's efforts to
represent him and had falsely stated to the defendant's attorney
that they would not interrogate her client.6 The Moran Court held
that under these circumstances the defendant had not been deprived of his right to counsel under either the fifth or sixth amend1. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 187 (1984); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682,
689 (1972). See also Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204-06 (1964).
2. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469-70 (1966).

3. Id. at 465-66.
4.

Id. at 479. See also Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964).

Although

statements obtained in violation of the fifth amendment right to counsel may not be used
as direct evidence, they may be used for impeachment. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S.
222, 223-24 (1971).
5.
6.

106 S. Ct. 1135 (1986).
Id. at 1140
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ment.7 The Court further held that the police treatment of the
defendant and his attorney had not violated the fundamental fairness guarantee of the fourteenth amendment due process clause."
Consequently, Moran has sanctioned police interference with efforts by attorneys to represent suspects during custodial interrogations conducted prior to the initiation of formal charges.
This note first will trace the development of the constitutional
doctrines the Court has used to analyze the admissibility of confessions under the fifth, sixth, and fourteenth amendments. Next, it
will examine the ethical issues raised by the interrogation of a represented suspect without the knowledge or consent of the suspect's
attorney. This note will then discuss the Moran decision, and conclude with an analysis of Moran's impact upon an individual's constitutional rights and the integrity of the attorney-client
relationship.
II. BACKGROUND

A. The Role of Due Process in Confession Case Analysis
The Supreme Court historically has followed a flexible approach
in defining the requirements of due process.9 The Court has indicated that the rights guaranteed by due process are simply those
rights mandated by fundamental and immutable precepts of liberty
and justice. 10
7. Id. at 1143, 1147.
8. Id. at 1147-48.
9. In 1855, the Court suggested that the fifth amendment due process clause derived
its meaning from the "settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common
and statute law of England." Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59
U.S. (18 How.) 272, 277 (1855). Thirty years later, the Court, in interpreting the fourteenth amendment due process clause, indicated that a more flexible approach was necessary to preserve the clause's significance for an "undefined and expanding future."
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 530-31 (1884).
10. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (due process rights defined to
be those rights "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" and described as rights without which "a fair and enlightened system" could not be imagined); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934) (due process rights considered to be those rights "inherent
in every concept of a fair trial that could be acceptable to the thought of reasonable
men"); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932) (due process rights viewed as those
rights mandated by "fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of
all our civil and political institutions").
In the criminal context, the Court has applied its flexible due process analysis to reach
various results. See, e.g., Mooney v. Hologan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935) (to mandate reversal
of a conviction obtained by the prosecutor's knowing use of perjured testimony); Moore
v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923) (to preclude a state from convicting a defendant in a
proceeding dominated by an antagonistic mob); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)
(to require that a state provide counsel to indigent defendants charged with capital
crimes). Although Powell established a fourteenth amendment right to counsel, the right
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In Brown v. Mississippi," decided in 1936, the Court, applying
due process standards, held that a confession elicited through
physical torture was inadmissible in a state court because the inter-2
rogation method had offended fundamental principles of justice.'
The coerced confessions in Brown were clearly unreliable. Accordingly, the holding in that case arguably went no further than to
establish trustworthiness as a minimum requirement of due process
in confession cases.1 3 In subsequent years, however, the Court indicated that the purpose of the due process requirement was not to
exclude unreliable confessions, but rather to ensure that police interrogation methods comport with notions of fundamental
fairness. 4
The method of analysis for determining the admissibility of a
confession under the due process clause has been labeled the "volto the assistance of counsel at trial is specifically guaranteed by the sixth amendment.
U.S. Const. amend. VI. It was not until 1963, however, that the Court held that the
protections of the sixth amendment were binding on the states. Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
More recently, the Court has held that the prosecution's use at trial of a suspect's
silence following the Miranda warnings violates the fundamental fairness requirements of
due process because this use breaches an implicit promise that silence shall carry no
penalty. Wainwright v. Greenfield, 106 S. Ct. 634 (1986). Similarly, the prosecution's
suppression of requested evidence which is favorable to the accused violates due process
when the evidence is probative of guilt or punishment. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83
(1963).
11. 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
12. Id. at 286. In Brown, a deputy sheriff severely whipped one of the defendants and
said that he would continue the whippings until the suspects confessed; they promptly did
so. Id. at 282-83.
13. See Note, Deceptive InterrogationTechniques and the Relinquishment of Constitutional Rights, 10 RUT.-CAM. L. J. 109, 114 (1978).
14. See, e.g., Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941) ("The aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively false evidence, but to prevent
fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, whether true or false."); Spano v. New
York, 360 U.S. 315, 320 (1959) (confession obtained by exploiting the defendant's friendship with a police officer was inadmissible on due process grounds); Leyra v. Denno, 347
U.S. 556 (1954) (confession held to be inadmissible on due process grounds where a doctor who the police had sent to treat the defendant's sinus condition was actually a highly
skilled psychiatrist employed to extract a confession); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S.
143 (1944) (admission of confession obtained after thirty-six hours of questioning violated
due process even though its trustworthiness was not in question).
In Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961), the Court specifically held that in determining the admissibility of a confession under the due process clause, judges should not
consider the probable truth of a confession, but only the fairness of the police methods
used to elicit the confession. Id. at 540-44. In Richmond, Justice Frankfurter wrote that
involuntary confessions must be excluded "not because such confessions are unlikely to
be true but because the methods used to extract them offend an underlying principle in
the enforcement of our criminal law: that ours is an accusatorial and not an inquisitorial
system." Id. at 540-41.
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untariness" test.' 5 Whether a statement has been voluntarily given
depends upon an examination of the "totality of the circumstances" surrounding the interrogation. 6 The "totality of the circumstances" approach permits courts to scrutinize police conduct
during the interrogation.' 7 This approach also allows for consideration of the suspect's age,' 8 physical condition, 9 and level of education or intelligence. 2 °
Although the Court generally has not hesitated to exclude confessions elicited through physical coercion, 2' the Court has demonstrated a reluctance to exclude confessions induced by police
trickery or deception absent physical coercion.22 Lower courts
15. See, e.g., Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367
U.S. 568 (1961).
16. The "totality of the circumstances" approach was first employed in Johnson v.
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). The Zerbst Court stated in a sixth amendment right to
counsel case that "[t]he determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of
the right to counsel must depend, in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case." Id. at 464. The phrase "totality of the circumstances"
was first used in connection with the due process voluntariness test in Fikes v. Alabama,
352 U.S. 191, 197 (1957), but the approach of examining the circumstances surrounding
the confession in each case existed long before the Court started using the phrase. See,
e.g., Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556, 558 (1954); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 53 (1949).
17. The Court has found a variety of coercive police stratagems to be factors weighing against the admissibility of confessions. See Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737
(1966) (sixteen day incommunicado detention); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961) (four
day incommunicado detention); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958) (forty-nine hour
incommunicado detention); Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1 (1924) (enforced sleeplessness); Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413 (1967) (solitary confinement);
Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519 (1968) and Sims v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 404 (1967)
(denial of food and water); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961) and Harris v. South
Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949) (threats to arrest or prosecute family members); Malinski v.
New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945) (humiliation; forced disrobing); Darwin v. Connecticut,
391 U.S. 346 (1968) and Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) (use of drugs or
hypnosis).
18. See, e.g., Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948).
19. See, e.g., Clewis v. Texas, 386 U.S. 707 (1967) (suspect suffering physical illness);
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (suspect wounded and in hospital intensive care
unit).
20. See, e.g., Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966) (defendant's lack of education remarked on in holding confession to be involuntary); Crooker v. California, 357
U.S. 433 (1958) (defendant's college education and one year of law school emphasized in
holding confession to be voluntary).
21. See Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966); Crooker v. California, 357 U.S.
433 (1958).
22. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 737 (1969). In Frazier, police falsely told the
defendant that his accomplice had confessed. Although the defendant "still was reluctant
to talk," a confession eventually was obtained. Id. The Court held that the police misrepresentation, while relevant, was insufficient to render the otherwise voluntary confession inadmissible. Id. at 739. Frazier was not the first time the Court was presented with
a case involving the accomplice confession ploy. In Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62
(1949), the Court noted that the police had falsely told the defendant that his accomplice
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have demonstrated a similar reluctance to exclude apparently reliable confessions that are elicited through police trickery or deception.23 Some courts have reasoned that police trickery is
permissible when nothing has been said or done to the suspect that
would be apt to make an innocent person confess.24 Among the
forms of police trickery that have been condoned are placing cosuspects together to encourage discussions of their criminal con26
duct,2 5 confronting suspects with physical evidence against them,
27 or promises to secure bail. 28
and making promises of leniency
had "opened up" on him, but did not stress this fact in finding that the defendant's confession was involuntary. Id. at 64.
In Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961), a confession was held to be involuntary because
the defendant's statement was given after a forty-eight hour incommunicado detention.
Id. at 440-42. In a strong dissent, Justice Clark condemned the trickery practiced in
Turner, stating:
[T]he petitioner "was falsely told that other suspects had 'opened up' on him."
Such a falsification, in my judgment, presents a much stronger case for relief
because at the outset Pennsylvania officers resorted to trickery. Moreover, such
a psychological artifice tends to prey upon the mind, leading its victim to either
resort to countercharges or to assume that "further resistance [is] useless," and
abandonment of claimed innocence the only course to follow.
Id. at 453 (Clark, J., dissenting).
23. See, e.g., Tucker v. State, 549 S.W.2d 285 (Ark. 1977); People v. Houston, 36 Ill.
App. 3d 695, 344 N.E.2d 641 (1976); State v. Stubenrauch, 503 S.W.2d 136 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1973); State v. Aguire, 91 N.M. 672, 579 P.2d 798 (1978); Evans v. Commonwealth,
215 Va. 609, 212 S.E.2d 268 (1975).
24. See, e.g., Canada v. State, 56 Ala. App. 722, 725, 325 So. 2d 513, 515 (Crim.
App.), cert. denied, 295 Ala. 395, 325 So. 2d 516 (1976) (tricks acceptable unless "likely"
to produce false confessions); R.W. v. State, 135 Ga. App. 668, 671, 218 S.E.2d 674, 676
(1975) ("test in determining voluntariness is whether an inducement, if any, was sufficient, by possibility, to elicit an untrue acknowledgement of guilt"); Commonwealth v.
Baity, 428 Pa. 306, 315, 237 A.2d 172, 177 (1968) (trick permissible as long as it has "no
tendency to produce a false confession").
25. See, e.g., People v. Crowson, 124 Cal. App. 3d 198, 177 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1981).
Commenting on the practice of placing co-suspects together, the Crowson court said:
Admittedly, this technique is not used for a defendant's benefit to memorialize
the nostalgia of errant behavior or for therapy to relieve his guilty conscience,
but for the purpose of obtaining relevant evidence to convict him. This reasonable law enforcement goal is not forbidden police deception or trickery where
the practice used does not intend to produce an unreliable result nor involve
brutality.
Id. at 201, 177 Cal. Rptr. at 354.
26. See, e.g., Combs v. Commonwealth, 438 S.W.2d 82 (Ky. 1969) (admissibility of
confession upheld where defendant was read ballistics report during interrogation); State
v. Burnett, 429 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. 1968) (admissibility of confession upheld where, during
interrogation, defendant was shown money seized from his home).
27. People v. Hartgraves, 31 111. 2d 375, 202 N.E.2d 33 (1964) (confession admissible
despite statement by authorities that it would "go easier" for suspect in court if statement
was made).
28. Hickox v. State, 138 Ga. App. 882, 227 S.E.2d 829 (1976) (statement admissible
despite promise to secure bail if statement was made).
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In the 1960s, authorities began questioning the adequacy of the
totality of the circumstances approach.29 The totality of the circumstances test was perceived as deficient because it did not provide an objective standard that could be applied consistently by
lower courts. 30 More importantly, the vagueness of the voluntariness test allowed courts to use it as a smoke screen to admit reliable confessions without regard to the fairness of the police
interrogation methods. 31 In addition, because lower courts frequently applied the voluntariness test improperly, its use resulted
in a severe administrative burden on the Supreme Court which was
forced to repeatedly review the erroneous lower court decisions. 32
B.

The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and
the Law of Confessions

During the 1960s, the Court began to look beyond due process
guidelines in analyzing the admissibility of confessions. Initially,
the Court turned to the sixth amendment which provides that "[i]n
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ...

to

have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense." 33 Originally, the
Court viewed the sixth amendment right to counsel as primarily, if
not exclusively, concerned with the presence of counsel at trial. 34
In 1932, the Supreme Court first recognized that for a defendant to
enjoy effective assistance of counsel at trial, he may need a lawyer's
assistance prior to the trial itself.35 The Court reasoned that because pretrial consultation, preparation, and investigation are of
29. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963); Kamisar, What is an
"Involuntary" Confession? Some Comments on Inbau and Reid's CriminalInterrogations
and Confessions, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 728, 744-46 (1963); Dix, Mistake, Ignorance, Expectation of Benefit, and the Modern Law of Confessions, WASH. U. L. Q. 275, 294-97
(1975).
30. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963) ("[t]he line between proper and
permissible police conduct and techniques and methods offensive to due process is, at
best, a difficult one to draw, particularly... where it is necessary to make fine judgments
as to the effect of psychologically coercive pressures and inducements on the mind and
will of an accused").
31. See, e.g., Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966). In Davis, the defendant
had been held incommunicado for sixteen days prior to making a confession. His arrest
sheet indicated that he was to have no visitors and was not allowed to use a telephone. Id.
at 744. Despite the obvious coerciveness of the circumstances, both the North Carolina
appellate courts and the lower federal courts had found the apparently trustworthy confession to be voluntary. Id. at 738-39.
32. See Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in the Burger Court, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 99,
102-03.
33. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
34. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
35. Id. at 71.
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much entitled to counsel's
such vital importance, defendants are as
36
assistance before trial as at trial itself.
In the 1964 case of Massiah v. United States, 37 the Court extended the sixth amendment right to counsel to interrogations following indictments or arraignments.38 Under Massiah, if the
accused is interrogated after indictment and without being afforded
the opportunity to seek the assistance of counsel, statements obtained during the interrogation cannot be used against him at
trial. 39 The Massiah Court recognized that assistance of counsel
during interrogation upholds the integrity of the sixth amendment
right to counsel at trial because statements elicited during interrogation may determine the outcome of a subsequent trial."°
In Escobedo v. Illinois,4 decided the same year as Massiah, the
Court again addressed the possibility of a sixth amendment right to
the presence of counsel during police interrogations.42 In Escobedo, the police denied the defendant's requests to speak with his
lawyer and failed to advise him of his right to remain silent during
a custodial interrogation.4 3 Unlike Massiah, the police interrogation in Escobedo occurred before the defendant had been indicted
or arraigned.' The Escobedo Court determined that the preindictment interrogation of the defendant had violated the sixth amendment because the defendant had not been permitted to consult with
his attorney.45 In justifying its extension of the sixth amendment
protections to preindictment interrogations, the Court reasoned
that "the 'right to use counsel at the formal trial [would be] a very
hollow thing [if], for all practical purposes, the conviction is already assured by pretrial examination.' "'46 Using broad language,
the Court suggested that a suspect's right to counsel attaches at
36. Id. at 57. See also Maine v. Moulton, 106 S. Ct. 477, 484 (1985) ("the assistance
of counsel cannot be limited to participation in a trial; to deprive a person of counsel
during the period prior to trial may be more damaging than denial of counsel during the
trial itself").
37. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
38. Id. at 206-07.
39. Id. at 207.
40. Id. at 204. The Massiah Court suggested that denying the defendant counsel at
post-indictment interrogations might deny him " 'effective representation by counsel at
the only stage when legal aid and advice would help him.'" Id. (quoting Spano v. New
York, 360 U.S. 315, 326 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring)).
41. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
42. Id. at 491.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 485.
45. Id. at 492.
46. Id. at 487 (quoting In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 344 (1957) (Black, J., dissenting)).
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some time before the suspect formally is charged, when "the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory-when its focus is on
the accused and its purpose is to elicit a confession." 47
Although Escobedo appeared to signal an expansion of the sixth
amendment's applicability to confession cases, the Court has limited that decision to its own facts.4 Instead of clarifying Escobedo's vaguely articulated "focus" test, the Court has held that the
sixth amendment right to counsel attaches only when "adversary
judicial proceedings" are initiated against the accused, such as by a
formal charge, indictment, information, arraignment, or preliminary hearing.49 The Court has reasoned that until adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated against a suspect, there is no
" 'criminal prosecution' to which alone the explicit guarantees of
the Sixth Amendment are applicable." 5 The Court further has
confined the reach of the sixth amendment right to counsel by
holding that once adversary judicial proceedings have commenced,
the accused is entitled to the guiding hand of counsel only at "critical stages" of the criminal process.5 1 "Critical stages" have been
defined as proceedings at which the substantial rights of the accused may be affected, and at which counsel's absence might derogate the accused's right to a fair trial.2
47. Id. at 492. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Court reaffirmed
Escobedo in dicta, stating that the sixth amendment is violated when police prevent an
attorney from consulting with his client irrespective of whether formal charges have been
filed. Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 465-66 n.35 (1966).
48. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972). Not only has the Court limited Escobedo to its facts, but it has also "in retrospect perceived that the 'prime purpose' of Escobedo was not to vindicate the constitutional right to counsel as such, but, like Miranda, to
... Id. at 689
guarantee full effectuation of the privilege against self-incrimination.
(citing Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 729 (1966)).
For an explanation of the Miranda decision, see infra notes 53-64 and accompanying
text.
49. See generally Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S.
387 (1977); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
50. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 690 (1972). In Kirby, the Court attempted to
justify its decision to limit the applicability of the sixth amendment to stages of the criminal process occurring after the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings, stating:
The initiation of judicial criminal proceedings is far from a mere formalism. It
is the starting point of our whole system of adversary criminal justice. For it is
only then that the Government has committed itself to prosecute, and only then
that the adverse positions of the government and defendant have solidified. It is
then that a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forces of organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of the substantive and procedural
criminal law.
Id. at 689.
51. Id. at 690; Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970); United States v. Wade, 388
U.S. 218, 224 (1967).
52. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227-28 (1967). Under the critical stage
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Miranda v. Arizona: The Role of the Fifth Amendment in
Confession Cases

Two years after Escobedo, the Court, continuing to look beyond
the fourteenth amendment voluntariness test, 3 yet disinclined to
clarify Escobedo's sixth amendment "focus" test, injected the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination into confession
case analyses. 4 In the landmark decision of Miranda v. Arizona,55
the Court recognized that custodial interrogations,56 by their very
nature, generate "compelling pressures which work to undermine
the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he
would not otherwise do so freely."5' 7 To combat the inherent pressures of the interrogation room and thereby protect the privilege
against self-incrimination, the Miranda Court mandated that law
enforcement officers follow certain procedural safeguards.5 These
safeguards require that prior to custodial interrogation, law enstandard, the Court has recognized a right to counsel at various points in the criminal
process. See, e.g., Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (preliminary hearings); United
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (post-indictment line-ups); Massiah v. United States,
377 U.S. 201 (1964) (interrogations).
After the initiation of criminal charges, however, a defendant does not have a right to
counsel at various other stages of the criminal process. See, e.g., United States v.
Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976) (grand jury proceedings); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S.
300 (1973) (post-indictment photo throwdowns); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972)
(preindictment line-ups).
53. See Dix, supra note 29, at 294-97. See also Kamisar, supra note 29, at 513.
54. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). An early Supreme Court case applied
the fifth amendment self-incrimination clause to interrogations conducted by federal officers. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897). Bram, however, signaled no real
change in the law of confessions due to the Court's holding that the fifth amendment
merely represented a "crystallization" of common law confession doctrine. Id. at 543.
Two years prior to Miranda, the Court first held the self-incrimination clause applicable to state criminal proceedings. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
55. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
56. Id. at 444. By custodial interrogation, the Miranda majority meant police-initiated questioning "after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way." Id.
57. Id. at 467-68.
58. Id. at 444. The fifth amendment provides in pertinent part: "[n]o person.., shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." U.S. Const. amend.
V. It is clear from the language of the fifth amendment that the self- incrimination clause
prohibits prosecutors from forcing criminal defendants to testify at trial. But the Court
has never read this clause literally so as to bar compelled testimony only during the
criminal trial itself. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-70 (1966). Rather, the
Court has recognized that if defendants could be required to testify at preliminary proceedings, and prosecutors could then use this testimony against the defendant at trial, the
defendant's right not to testify at trial would be meaningless. Id.Accordingly, the fifth
amendment has been interpreted to prohibit compelled testimony at preliminary hearings, grand jury hearings, or any other proceedings where the witness's answers might
furnish evidence that could be used against him in a criminal case. Id.
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forcement officers advise the suspect of his rights to remain silent
and to have an attorney present during questioning. 9 Unless the
prosecution can demonstrate compliance with these safeguards, it
is prohibited from using statements elicited from a suspect during
custodial interrogation. 60 Miranda's requirement that suspects be
warned of their right to have counsel present during questioning,
in effect, has created a fifth amendment right to counsel during
preindictment custodial interrogation that is distinct from the right
to counsel assured by the sixth amendment. The rationale for the
fifth amendment right is that counsel's presence in the interrogation room "insure[s] that the statements made in the governmentestablished atmosphere are not the product of compulsion. "61
Miranda further provided that a suspect may waive his rights
against self-incrimination "provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently." 6 2 Because of the compelling atmosphere of the custodial setting, and because of the difficulty of
proving what actually occurs during custodial interrogation, the
Miranda Court placed a "heavy burden" on the prosecution to
show the effectiveness of a waiver. 63 The Miranda Court also
59. Id. at 479.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 466-69. ("the right to have counsel present at the interrogation is indispensible to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege [against self-incrimination]
under the system we delineate today").
62. Id. at 444.
63. Id. at 475. Not only is there a natural tendency to discredit the testimony of
crime suspects because of their alleged deeds and their obvious interest, but the desire to
insure convictions of apparently guilty suspects may lead law enforcement officers to
color their testimony about police conduct during custodial interrogation. See United
States v. Carigan, 342 U.S. 36, 46 (1951) (Douglas, J., concurring) ("[w]hat happens
behind doors that are opened and closed at the sole discretion of the police is a black
chapter in every country-the free as well as the despotic, the modern as well as the
ancient").
Describing the prosecution's burden with regard to establishing that a valid waiver was
made, the Miranda Court stated:
An express statement that the individual is willing to make a statement and
does not want an attorney followed closely by a statement could constitute a
waiver. But a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the
accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession was
eventually obtained.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.
The "heavy burden" language of Miranda presently is subject to some question. F.
INBAU, J. THOMPSON, J. HADDAD, J. ZAGEL, G. STARKMAN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
135 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinafter "F. INBAU"]. In Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972),
the Court held that the prosecution can introduce a confession upon proof of its voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 484. It has been argued from this
decision that because the coercion of a confession is more serious than a Miranda violation, the prosecution should not bear a greater burden of proof in showing compliance
with Miranda than it does in establishing voluntariness. F. INBAU, supra, at 135.
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stated that "any evidence that the accused was threatened, tricked
or cajoled into a waiver will

. . .

show that the defendant did not

voluntarily waive his privilege [against self-incrimination]." '
Subsequent to Miranda, the Court further has defined the standard for determining whether a suspect has waived his privilege
against self-incrimination.65 The Court has held that an express
statement is not essential for a finding of valid waiver, but that
waivers can be inferred from the actions and words of the suspect.66 In addition, the Court has indicated that waivers should be
examined for validity under the totality of the circumstances test.67
The totality of the circumstances test in the waiver context, however, suffers from the same problems as the totality test used for
determining the voluntariness of confessions. 68 Before Miranda,
debate had centered around the voluntariness of confessions; since
Miranda the debate simply has shifted to the voluntariness of
waivers.69
Although the validity of a waiver generally is determined by the
totality of the circumstances test, in certain situations courts have
found it necessary to establish conclusive presumptions against the
validity of waivers made in the custodial setting. 70 For instance,
64. Miranda,384 U.S. at 476. The standards for valid waiver set out in the Miranda
opinion have proven to be a source of great confusion and disagreement for the Court.
The major Supreme Court cases addressing the issue of waivers under Miranda have
featured vehement dissents and lengthy concurrences. See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 106 S.
Ct. 1135 (1986); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983); Edwards v. Arizona, 451
U.S. 477, reh'g denied, 452 U.S. 973 (1981); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369
(1979); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975).
65. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
66. Id. at 373.
67. Id. ("the question of waiver must be determined on the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case, including the background, experience and conduct of
the accused").
68. See generally Note, Totality of the Circumstances: A Guidelinefor Waiver of Miranda Rights?, 51 U. COLO. L. REV. 247 (1980).
69. Id. The fourteenth amendment voluntariness test still plays an important role in
confession case analyses. A confession may be involuntary on due process grounds, and
therefore inadmissible, even though police complied with Miranda requirements. See
United States v. Scott, 592 F.2d 1139, 1142 (10th Cir. 1979); United States v. Brown, 557
F.2d 541, 551 (6th Cir. 1977). Additionally, while statements obtained in violation of
Miranda may not be used as direct evidence, they may be used for impeachment in cases
in which "the trustworthiness of the evidence satisfie[s] legal standards." Harris v. New
York, 401 U.S. 222, 224 (1971). Involuntary statements obtained in violation of due
process, however, cannot be used for either direct or impeachment evidence. Mincey v.
Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978). Finally, due process voluntariness standards will
govern in non-custodial contexts in which Miranda does not apply. See Oregon v.
Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam).
70. See, e.g., Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85
(1981).
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the Supreme Court in Miranda created a conclusive presumption
against the validity of a waiver given during custodial interrogation
when the suspect was not warned of his constitutional rights."
The Court also has established a conclusive presumption against
the validity of waivers of counsel given during custodial interrogation when law enforcement officers initiate questioning after the
suspect has invoked his right to counsel.72
In addition, numerous state courts have created conclusive presumptions against the validity of waivers of counsel when a lawyer
retained by or for a suspect attempted to render legal advice or
assistance to the suspect, and the police intentionally or negligently
failed to inform the suspect of that fact. 73 These courts have reasoned that a suspect aware that he has present access to his own
attorney will be far less likely to waive his right to consult with
that attorney than a suspect who is merely advised of an abstract
right to consult with some unknown attorney.74 Because knowledge of his attorney's availability is likely to affect a suspect's decision whether or not to exercise his rights, those courts have
concluded that depriving the suspect of this knowledge precludes a
knowing and intelligent waiver."5
71. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
72. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981). The rule in Edwards rested on
the fifth amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. Id. More recently,
the Court has held that the sixth amendment also precludes a valid waiver after the right
to counsel has been asserted. Michigan v. Jackson, 106 S. Ct. 1404, 1411 (1986).
73. See Weber v. State, 457 A.2d 674, 688 (Del. 1983); Haliburton v. Florida, 476 So.
2d 192, 194 (Fla. 1985); People v. Smith, 93 Ill. 2d 179, 189, 442 N.E.2d 1325, 1329
(1982); State v. Matthews, 408 So. 2d 1247, 1248 (La. 1982); Commonwealth v. Sherman,
389 Mass. 287, 296, 450 N.E.2d 566, 571 (1983); Lodowski v. State, 302 Md. 691, 721,
490 A.2d 1228, 1243 (1985); Lewis v. State, 695 P.2d 528, 531 (Okla. 1984); State v.
Haynes, 288 Or. 59, 70, 602 P.2d 272, 277 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 945 (1980); State
v. Jones, 19 Wash. App. 850, 853, 578 P.2d 71, 73 (1978).
74. This rationale was first articulated by Judge Linde of the Oregon Supreme Court
who reasoned as follows:
To pass up an abstract offer to call some unknown lawyer is very different from
refusing to talk with an identified attorney actually available to provide at least
initial assistance and advice, whatever might be arranged in the long run. A
suspect indifferent to the first offer may well react quite differently to the
second.
State v. Haynes, 288 Or. 59, 72, 602 P.2d 272, 278 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 945
(1980).
75. See Weber v. State, 457 A.2d 674, 688 (Del. 1983); Haliburton v. Florida, 476
So.2d 192, 194 (Fla. 1985); People v. Smith, 93 Ill. 2d 179, 189, 442 N.E.2d 1325, 1329
(1982); State v. Matthews, 408 So. 2d 1247, 1248 (La. 1982); Lodowski v. State, 302 Md.
691, 721, 490 A.2d 1228, 1243 (1985); Commonwealth v. Sherman, 389 Mass. 287, 296,
450 N.E.2d 566, 571 (1983); Lewis v. State, 695 P.2d 528, 531 (Okla. 1984); State v.
Haynes, 288 Or. 59, 70, 602 P.2d 272, 277 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 945 (1980); State
v. Jones, 19 Wash. App. 850, 853, 578 P.2d 71, 73 (1978).
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The New York courts have promulgated a more expansive rule
than that adopted by most states for determining the validity of
waivers made by represented suspects during custodial interrogation.76 In People v. Hobson," the New York Court of Appeals held
that state constitutional guarantees of the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to assistance of counsel, and due process of
law, require that ". . . once a lawyer has entered the proceedings in
connection with the charges under investigation, a person in custody may validly waive the assistance of counsel only in the presence of a lawyer .
"7.8."" The New York court acknowledged that
the state constitutional basis for this rule extended defendants'
state constitutional protections beyond those afforded by the federal Constitution. 79 The court, however, found that this extension
was mandated by the nexus between the suspect's privilege against
self-incrimination and his right to the assistance of counsel.8 0 The
Hobson court reasoned that while warnings alone may sufficiently
protect the privilege against self-incrimination, the presence of
counsel is a more effective safeguard against an involuntary waiver
of counsel than the mere written or oral warnings given in counsel's absence.8 '
D.

The Ethics of InterrogatingSuspects Known to be
Represented Without Counsel's Knowledge

In invalidating the waiver after police failed to inform the suspect of his attorney's efforts to represent him, the Hobson court
considered the ethical issues raised by the interrogation of represented suspects in the absence of their attorneys.8 2 The court held
that an attempt to secure a waiver of the right to counsel in the
76. See People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976);
People v. Arthur, 22 N.Y.2d 325, 239 N.E.2d 537, 292 N.Y.S.2d 663 (1968); People v.
Donovan, 13 N.Y.2d 148, 193 N.E.2d 628, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841 (1963).
77. 39 N.Y.2d 479, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976).
78. Id. at 484, 348 N.E.2d at 897, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 422. See also People v. Donovan,
13 N.Y.2d 148, 151, 193 N.E.2d 628, 629, 243 N.Y.S.2d 841, 843 (1963) (". . . quite apart
from the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, this State's constitutional
and statutory provisions pertaining to the privilege against self-incrimination and the
right to counsel, not to mention our own guarantee of due process, require the exclusion
of a confession taken from a defendant, during a period of detention, after his attorney
has requested and been denied access to him") (citations omitted). In 1977, Pennsylvania
became the first, and, thus far, the only other state to adopt the New York rule. Commonwealth v. Hillard, 471 Pa. 318, 320, 370 A.2d 322, 324 (1977).
79. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d at 484, 348 N.E.2d at 898, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 422 (1976).
80. Id. at 483-84, 348 N.E.2d at 897, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
81. Id. at 484, 348 N.E.2d at 898, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
82. Id. at 487, 348 N.E.2d at 898, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 423.
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absence of a lawyer, already retained or assigned, constitutes a
breach of Disciplinary Rule ("DR") 7-104(A)(1) of the American
Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility.83
DR 7-104(A)(1) prohibits a lawyer for one party from discussing
his client's case with another represented party unless the lawyer
4
has the other attorney's consent or is authorized by law to do so.1
The purpose of this provision is to "preserve the integrity of the
attorney-client relationship by protecting the represented party
85
from the superior knowledge and skill of the opposing lawyer.
86
Authorities agree that DR 7-104(A)(1) applies to prosecutors.
Accordingly, it is considered unethical for a prosecutor to question
a represented defendant without notice to the defendant's attorney
and either a reasonable opportunity for that attorney to be present
or the attorney's permission to question the defendant in his ab83. Id.
84. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104(A) (1969). Since
1908, the legal profession has had in force rules restricting an attorney's communication
with the opposing party. In 1908 the American Bar Association ("ABA") adopted the
Canons of Professional Ethics which included Canon 9, entitled "Negotiations with Opposite Party." CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS CANON 9 (1908). Canon 9 prohibited
lawyers from communicating directly with a party represented by counsel on the subject
of the controversy. Id. In 1969, the ABA replaced the Canons with the Code of Professional Responsibility. DR 7-104(A)(1) of the Code provides in part:
(A) During the course of his representation of a client a lawyer shall not:
(1) Communicate or cause another to communicate on the subject of the
representation with a party he knows to be represented by a lawyer in that
matter unless he has the prior consent of the lawyer representing such other
party or is authorized by law to do so.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104 (1969). Additionally, Ethical Consideration 7-18 accompanying the ABA Code provides in part:
The legal system in its broadest sense functions best when persons in need of
legal advice or assistance are represented by their own counsel. For this reason
a lawyer should not communicate on the subject matter of the representation of
his client with a person he knows to be represented in the matter by a lawyer,
unless pursuant to law or rule of court or unless he has the consent of the
lawyer for that person....
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-18 (1969).
In 1983, the American Bar Association adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct with the intention that they eventually replace the Model Code. Rule 4.2 of the new
Model Rules of Professional Conduct is similar to DR 7-104(A). Rule 4.2 provides:
In representing a client a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of
the representation with a party that the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer
or is authorized by law to do so.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT RULE 4.2 (1983).
The majority of the states still follow the Model Code with some differences in its
provisions from state to state. The Model Rules, however, have been adopted in eleven
states again with some variations in its provisions among the individual states.
85. ABA/BNA LAWYERS MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 71:303 (1984).
86. Id. at § 71.320.
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sence s7 Prosecutors, however, have argued that DR 7-104(A)(1)
is inapplicable when the interrogator is not an attorney.88 This argument has been rejected by the American Bar Association because non-lawyer interrogators may be considered agents of the
prosecuting attorney, and because the danger that a police interrogator will threaten or deceive a suspect is as great as the danger
that a lawyer will do so.8 9 Thus, it also is considered unethical for
a prosecutor to take advantage of the results of such an interrogation by police officers. 9°
While state and federal courts agree that a prosecutor commits
an ethical violation by interrogating a represented suspect without
the knowledge or permission of the suspect's attorney or by using
the results of such an interrogation, most courts have held that
such a violation does not rise to the level of constitutional error
and does not mandate suppression of statements obtained during
the improper interrogation. 91 A minority of courts, however, have
held that ethical considerations preclude authorities from offering
a confession that 9they
extracted in the absence of the defendant's
2
retained attorney.

87. Id. See also Moore v. Wolff, 495 F.2d 35 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Cobbs,
481 F.2d 196 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d 110 (10th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Four Star, 428 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1970); People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d
479, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976).
88. See Leubsdorf, Communicating With Another Lawyer's Client. The Lawyer's Veto
and the Client's Interests, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 683, 701 (1979).
89. See ABA/BNA LAWYERS MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 71:320
(1984). In Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d at 486, 348 N.E.2d at 898, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 423, the New
York Court of Appeals articulated the rationale for applying DR 7-104 (A)(1) to police
interrogations:
Of course, it would not be rational, logical, moral or realistic to make any distinction between a lawyer acting for the State who violates the ethic directly and
one who indirectly uses the admissions improperly obtained by a police officer,
who is the badged and uniformed representative of the State. To do so would
be, in the most offensive way, to permit that to be done indirectly what is not
permitted directly.
90. See Moore v. Wolff, 495 F.2d 35 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Cobbs, 481 F.2d
196 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d 110 (10th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Four Star, 428 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1970); People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 348
N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976).
91.

See, e.g., Moore v. Wolff, 495 F.2d 35, 37 (8th Cir. 1974)

("...

such a violation

has not been felt to rise to the level of constitutional error, nor even to compel reversal in
those federal prosecutions where reversal might have been made under the general supervisory power of the courts of appeals [sic] over federal district courts.").
92. See, e.g,, United States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d 110 (10th Cir. 1973). In Thomas, the
court held that once a criminal defendant has retained an attorney or had an attorney
appointed for him, any statement obtained by interrogating the defendant cannot be offered into evidence for any purpose unless the defendant's attorney was notified of the
interrogation and was given a reasonable opportunity to be present. Id. at 112.
Several of the other federal courts of appeal have condemned the practice of custodial
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MORAN V. BURBINE

A. FactualBackground
On the afternoon of June 29, 1977, the defendant, Burbine, was
arrested by Cranston, Rhode Island police in connection with a
local burglary. 93 Shortly after Burbine was placed in custody, a
Cranston police officer learned that Burbine may have been the
person responsible for murdering a young woman several months
earlier in Providence, Rhode Island. 94 Burbine was advised of his
Miranda rights and at that time refused to sign a written waiver or
to make a statement. 95
Later that day, Burbine's sister, unbeknownst to him, telephoned the Public Defender's Office to obtain legal assistance for
her brother. 96 As she was unaware that her brother was under suspicion for murder, her only concern was the breaking and entering
charge. 97 As a result of this telephone call, an Assistant Public
Defender, Allegra Munson, learned of Burbine's custody. 98 Approximately five hours after Burbine's arrest, Ms. Munson called
the detective division of the Cranston police station, identified herself and asked if Burbine was being held. 99 She was told that he
was.'00 Ms. Munson stated that she would act as Burbine's legal
counsel in the event that the police intended to place him in a lineinterrogation in the absence of and without the permission of retained or appointed counsel, but have stopped short of requiring the suppression of statements obtained through
this practice. See United States v. Foley, 735 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1984); Moore v. Wolff, 495
F.2d 35 (8th Cir. 1974); United States v. Cobbs, 481 F.2d 196 (3d Cir. 1973); United
States v. Thomas, 474 F.2d 110 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Four Star, 428 F.2d
1406 (9th Cir. 1970).
93. Moran v. Burbine, 106 S. Ct. 1135, 1138 (1986).
94. Id. Burbine actually was arrested along with two other men in connection with
the burglary and the trio of suspects was placed in separate rooms for interrogation. Id.
Two days before the arrest, Detective Ferranti of the Cranston police department learned
from a confidential informant that the man responsible for the beating death of Mary Jo
Hickey in Providence lived at 306 New York Avenue and went by the name of "Butch."
Ferranti found out from one of the men arrested with Burbine that Burbine was the only
"Butch" living at that address. Burbine v. Moran, 753 F.2d 178, 180 (1st Cir. 1985).
95. 106 S. Ct. at 1138. When Burbine refused to sign a written waiver Ferranti spoke
separately with the two other burglary suspects and obtained statements from them implicating Burbine in the Providence murder. Id. At about 6:00 p.m., Ferranti telephoned
the Providence police to convey the information he had uncovered, and an hour later
three Providence police officers arrived intending to question Burbine about the murder.
Id.
96. Id. at 1139.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. The person Ms. Munson spoke to answered the telephone with the word
"detectives," but the record apparently did not reveal who this individual was.
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up or question him.'°' She was informed that the police would not
be questioning Burbine or putting him in a line-up and that they
were through with him for the night. 102 Ms. Munson
was not in°3
murder.'
the
in
suspect
a
was
Burbine
that
formed
Less than an hour after this conversation, the Cranston and
Providence police officers began conducting a series of interviews
with Burbine about the murder. '° Although Burbine was informed of his Miranda rights prior to each session, he did not request an attorney. 05 Additionally, at all relevant times, Burbine
06
was unaware of his sister's efforts to retain counsel on his behalf.'
During the course of the evening, Burbine signed three waiver-ofrights forms. 107 Burbine subsequently made three written statements in which he admitted to the murder.'08
The trial court denied Burbine's motion to suppress the three
statements.' 9 Burbine's confession was admitted at trial, and he
was found guilty of first degree murder."10 On appeal to the
Supreme Court of Rhode Island, a divided court affirmed
Burbine's conviction. 1 ' The Rhode Island Supreme Court rejected the defendant's contention that the failure of the police to
inform Burbine of Ms. Munson's efforts to represent him had undermined the validity of the defendant's waivers." 2
After unsuccessfully petitioning the United States District Court
for the District of Rhode Island for a writ of habeas corpus, " 3 the
defendant appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit. That court reversed, finding that the police conduct
had fatally tainted Burbine's waiver.'
The appellate court reasoned that by failing to inform Burbine that his attorney had called
and that she had been assured that no questioning would take place
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Burbine v. Moran, 589 F. Supp. 1245, 1248 (D. R.I. 1984).
109. Id. The lower court found that Ms. Munson had made the phone call; that there
had been no collusion or conspiracy on the part of the police to secrete Burbine from his
attorney; that Burbine had not been threatened, coerced, or promised any benefit in exchange for his statements; and that Burbine had validly waived his right to counsel and
his privilege against self-incrimination. Id.
110. Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1140.
111. State v. Burbine, 451 A.2d 22 (R.I. 1982).
112. Id. at 29.
113. Burbine v. Moran, 589 F.Supp. 1245 (D. R.I. 1984).
114. Burbine v. Moran, 753 F.2d 178, 184 (1st Cir. 1985).
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until the next day, the police had deprived Burbine of information
crucial to his ability to knowingly and intelligently waive his
rights." 5 The court also found that the police conduct amounted
to "deliberate or reckless irresponsibility,"" 16 and that this kind of
blameworthy action by the police, combined with the defendant's
ignorance of his attorney's telephone call, precluded any claim of
valid waiver." 7 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether pre-arraignment confessions preceded by
otherwise valid waivers must be suppressed either because the police failed to inform the suspect of his attorney's communications
or because they misinformed the suspect's attorney about their
plans to interrogate the suspect.'
B.

The Majority Opinion

Justice O'Connor's opinion for a six member majority began
with a discussion of the waiver issue.' 19 The Court applied a twopart test to determine whether the defendant had validly waived
his Miranda rights. 2 First, the waiver had to be voluntary: the
product of free and deliberate choice rather than police intimidation, coercion, or deception.' 2' Second, the waiver had to be made
with full awareness of the nature of the right being waived and the
consequences of its relinquishment.122 Commenting that the police
had not employed physical or psychological pressure to obtain
Burbine's confession, the Court determined that the voluntariness
of the defendant's waiver was not at issue. 2 3a Similarly, the Court
said there was no question that the defendant had understood the
nature and extent of the rights set out in the Miranda warnings and
24
the potential consequences of his decision to relinquish them.

125
Accordingly, the defendant's waiver was deemed valid.
The Court rejected the First Circuit's conclusion that the failure

115. Id. at 187.
116. Id. at 185. On review, the Supreme Court expressed "serious doubts" about
whether the First Circuit was free to conclude that the police conduct constituted "deliberate or reckless irresponsibility" in light of the state court's finding that there had been
no police conspiracy or collusion. 106 S. Ct. at 1142.
117. Burbine v. Moran, 753 F.2d at 187.
118. Moran v. Burbine, 105 S. Ct. 2319 (1985).
119. Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1141.
120. Id. at 1141 (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977)).
121. Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1141.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1142.
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of the police to inform Burbine of his attorney's telephone call had
fatally undermined his otherwise valid waiver.' 2 6 The Court reasoned that "[e]vents occurring outside of the presence of the suspect and entirely unknown to him can have no bearing on the
capacity to comprehend and knowingly relinquish a constitutional
right."' 27 While recognizing that informing Burbine of his attorney's communication might have affected his decision to confess,
the Court held that the Constitution does not require police to provide suspects with a "flow of information" to help them calibrate
their self-interest while deciding whether to waive their constitutional rights.128
Concluding its discussion of the waiver issue, the Court held
that the level of police culpability in failing to inform the defendant
of his attorney's telephone call also did not undermine the validity
of the defendant's waiver. 29 Recalling Miranda'sdicta that a suspect who is "threatened, tricked or cajoled" into a waiver has not
voluntarily waived his rights,' 3 ° the Moran Court determined that
the failure to inform Burbine of his attorney's telephone call was
not the kind of trickery that can vitiate a waiver.' 'I According to
the Court, police trickery is only relevant to the validity of a waiver
if it deprives the suspect of knowledge essential to his ability to
comprehend the nature of his rights and the consequences of their
relinquishment.'32
Having dispensed with the waiver issue, the Court next rejected
Burbine's invitation to extend Miranda principles to create a constitutional rule requiring the police to inform a suspect of an attorney's efforts to reach him.' 33 According to the majority,
interpreting Miranda to forbid police deception of an attorney
would ignore the very purpose of that decision which was to insure
the privilege against self-incrimination, not to "mold police conduct for its own sake."'' 34 The Court remarked that although the
126. Id.
127. Id. at 1141.
128. Id. at 1142.
129. Id. ("[W]hether intentional or inadvertent, the state of mind of the police is
irrelevant to the question of the intelligence and voluntariness of the respondent's election
to abandon his rights. Although highly inappropriate, even deliberate deception of an
attorney could not possibly affect a suspect's decision to waive his Miranda rights unless
he were at least aware of the incident.").
130. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476.
131. Moran, 106 S.Ct. at 1142.
132. Id.
133. Id.at 1142-43.
134. Id at 1143 ("[t]he ...Miranda warnings are not themselves rights protected by
the Constitution but [are] instead measures to insure that the [suspect's] right against self-
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proposed rule might add marginally to Miranda's goal of reducing
the compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation, overriding
practical considerations counseled against its adoption.'3 5 Specifically, the Court feared that a constitutional rule requiring police to
inform suspects of their attorney's communications would inevitably muddy "Miranda'sotherwise relatively clear waters,"'3 1 6 leaving police officers, prosecutors, and courts in doubt about the
circumstances under which statements obtained during custodial
interrogations will be admissible. 3 7 The other "overriding practical consideration" mentioned by the Court was the danger that the
proposed rule would upset the balance struck in Miranda between
the need for police questioning as a tool for effective law enforceensure that suspects are free from compelled
ment, and the need to
1 38
self-incrimination.
Although the questioning in Moran took place before the initiation of "adversary judicial proceedings," '3 9 the defendant had argued that the police conduct nonetheless violated the sixth
amendment right to counsel. 4° Burbine claimed that the sixth
amendment carries a right to noninterference with the attorney client relationship.1 4 ' This right, Burbine argued, attaches at the moincrimination [is] protected.") (citing New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984);
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)).
135. Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1143.
136. Id. The Court speculated that the proposed rule would spawn a multitude of
legal questions, including:

To what extent should
cused has counsel? Is
must the interrogating
suspect? Do counsel's

the police be held accountable for knowing that the acit enough that someone in the station house knows, or
officer himself know of counsel's efforts to contact the
efforts to talk to the suspect concerning one criminal

investigation trigger the obligation to inform the defendant before interrogation
may proceed on a wholly separate matter?
police should be held
Id. The dissenters had ready responses to all three questions: ...
accountable [for knowing that the suspect has counsel] to the extent that the attorney or
the suspect informs the police of the representation." Id. at 1162 n.46 (Stevens, J., dissenting). As to who in the police station must know of counsel's efforts, the dissenters
responded: "police should be held responsible for getting a message of this importance
from one officer to another." Id. Finally, to the question of whether counsel's efforts to
represent the suspect in connection with one charge trigger a police obligation to inform
before interrogating the suspect on another charge, the dissenters answer simply, "yes."
Id.
137. Id. at 1143.
138. Id. at 1144 ("Because neither the letter nor the purposes of Miranda require this
additional handicap on otherwise permissible investigatory efforts, we are unwilling to
expand the Miranda rules to require the police to keep the suspect abreast of the status of
his legal representation").
139. See supra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
140. Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1145.
141. Id.
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ment the relationship is formed, or alternatively, once the
defendant is placed in custodial interrogation. 4 ' The Court rejected this contention by strongly reaffirming the principle that the
sixth amendment right to counsel applies only after adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated.' 43 According to the Court, it
would be illogical for the sixth amendment right to counsel to attach at various times "depending on the fortuity of whether the
suspect or his family happens to have retained counsel prior to interrogation."'" The Court also rejected Burbine's argument that
the sixth amendment should attach at the formation of the attorney-client relationship.'45 This argument, said the Court, misconceived the purpose of the right to counsel, which it reasoned was
not to protect the attorney-client relationship for its own sake, but
rather to assure that in any "criminal prosecution," the accused
would not be left to face the "prosecutorial forces of organized society" on his own. 4 6 The Court concluded that because Burbine
had not been formally charged when he was interrogated, he was
not facing the prosecutorial forces of society, and therefore had no
sixth amendment right to counsel during that interrogation.'
Finally, Burbine contended that failure to inform him of his attorney's communication, coupled with police deception of his attorney, violated the due process clause. 48 While conceding that
the egregiousness of police deception might rise to the level of a
due process violation, the Court held that the police conduct in
Moran fell short of "the kind of misbehavior that so shocks the
sensibilities of civilized society as to warrant a federal intrusion
49
into the criminal processes of the state.'
C. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens, joined in a ringing dissent by Justices Brennan
and Marshall, began by noting the majority's rejection of an abundance of state court precedent under which police failure to inform
suspects of their attorney's communications or to permit counsel
access to clients in custody had been held to vitiate a suspect's
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1146.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. (citing Maine v. Moulton, 106 S. Ct. 477, 484 (1986); Kirby v. Illinois, 406
U.S. 682, 689 (1972)).
147. Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1147.
148. Id. at 1147-48.
149. Id. at 1148.
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waiver of his Miranda rights. 50 Justice Stevens commented that
this departure from state precedent was particularly surprising in
light of the fact that the majority had rejected the defendant's due
process argument to avoid "federal intrusion into the criminal
processes of the states." 15 ' Not only had the majority brushed
aside an entire body of law on the subject, but, the dissent remarked, it had also disregarded the recommendations of the American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal Justice-a source
that the Court had often looked to for guidance in the past.I52
Having expressed disapproval of the majority's departure from
state precedent and the standards of the legal profession, the dissent proceeded to attack the Court's departure from its own precedents.' 53 According to the dissent, the Court's prior decisions
indicated that the failure of police to inform a suspect of his attorney's communications rendered a subsequent waiver invalid. 154
The dissent noted that the Court has always applied a heavy
presumption against the validity of waivers given during incommunicado custodial interrogation. 15 Justice Stevens also recalled Miranda's statement that a waiver induced by threats, trickery, or
cajolement was involuntary. 156 In the dissenter's view, no constitu150. Id. at 1151 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also supra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
151. Moran, 106 S.Ct. at 1159 (Stevens, J.,dissenting).
152. Id. at 1151-52, n. 12 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice advise that suspects be provided with counsel or permitted to communicate with
counsel as soon as feasible after custody begins. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUS-

§ 5-5.1, 5-7.1 (2d ed. 1980). The Court has relied on the Standards for guidance in
several cases. See Moran, 106 S.Ct. at 1152, n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Nix v.
Whiteside, 106 S.Ct. 988 (1986); Caldwell v. Mississippi, 105 S.Ct. 2633 (1985); Holloway v. Anderson, 435 U.S. 475 (1978); Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970)).
Justice Stevens also noted that the American Bar Association filed an amicus brief in
Moran in which it expressed deep concern that "if the police may constitutionally prevent
any communication between a lawyer and an individual held in isolation, an important
right to legal representation will be lost. . . .Many cases decided across the country
demonstrate that there is cause for concern as to such police tactics." Moran, 106 S.Ct.
1152 n. 14 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for American Bar Association as Amicus
Curiae at 4).
153. Moran, 106 S.Ct. at 1152 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("the Court misapprehends or
rejects the central principles that have, for several decades, animated this Court's decisions concerning incommunicado interrogation").
154. Id. at 1157. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 1157 n.32 (citing Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977) ("courts
indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver"); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 475 (1966) ("heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination"); Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) ("courts indulge every reasonable presumption
against waiver of fundamental constitutional rights")).
156. Moran, 106 S.Ct. at 1158 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at
TICE
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tional distinction should have been drawn between tricking a suspect into waiving his rights by actively misleading him, and
tricking him by concealing the "critical fact" that his attorney had
offered assistance.' 57 Furthermore, the dissent emphasized that an
attorney's communications to the police about his client had a direct bearing on the suspect's knowing and intelligent waiver of his
constitutional rights.'
The dissent observed that a suspect informed of a particular attorney's present availability would be less
inclined to waive his right to an attorney than a suspect who was
merely advised of his abstract right to counsel.' 59 Accordingly, the
dissent concluded that the failure to inform a suspect of his attorney's communications deprived the suspect of knowledge essential
to his ability to "knowingly" exercise his rights.' 6°
The Moran majority declined to adopt a constitutional rule requiring police to inform suspects of their attorney's communications, stating that such a rule would upset Miranda's careful
balance between law enforcement interests and the need to prevent
compelled self-incrimination.' 6' Criticizing the Court's discussion
of the Miranda balance, Justice Stevens stated that the cost of a
rule requiring the police to inform a suspect of his attorney's call
simply would be the decreased likelihood that custodial interrogation will enable the police to obtain a confession.' 62 This cost, the
dissent maintained, "was nothing more than a recognition that the
law enforcement interest in obtaining convictions suffers whenever
a suspect 3exercises the rights afforded by our system of criminal
6

justice."'

1

The dissent further observed that in several contexts the Court
had considered the reduced likelihood that the police would obtain
a confession a cost "necessary to preserve the character of our free
society and our rejection of an inquisitorial system."'" 6 Just as the
476)). The dissent argued that Miranda "clearly establishes that both kinds of deception
vitiate the suspect's waiver of his right to counsel." Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1158 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
157. Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1158 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 1159 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159. Id. at 1159-60 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See also supra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
160. Id. at 1159-60 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 1144 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 1160 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 1161 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 1160-61 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S.
200 (1979); Miranda v. Arizona, 388 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964)). In Escobedo, the defendant had not been permitted to consult with his attorney
and the attorney had not been allowed access to the defendant. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 479-
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cost to efficient law enforcement does not justify taking suspects
into custody without probable cause or interrogating suspects
without warnings, argued the dissent, this cost also does not justify
permitting police to withhold knowledge of an attorney's communications. 6 The dissent further reasoned that the majority's cost/
benefit analysis, taken to its logical conclusion, would justify the
repudiation of the existing right to be warned of entitlement to
counsel.' 66 The dissent explained that to presume that advice concerning an attorney's immediate availability does not affect the voluntariness of a decision to confess, was barely distinguishable from
presuming that every citizen knows his rights and thus no warnings are needed. 167 Both presumptions serve law enforcement interests in obtaining confessions, and the costs of both presumptions
could be dismissed by the majority as no more than an incremental
increase in the risk that an individual will unintelligently waive his
rights. 16
The dissent next addressed the majority's concern that a rule
requiring police to inform a suspect of his attorney's efforts to
reach him would undermine Miranda's clarity. 69 On this point,
Justice Stevens suggested that the majority's evaluation had been
one-sided.170 According to the dissent, Miranda was intended not
only as a guide for police officers, but also as a guide to the suspect
being asked to waive his constitutional rights.' 7 ' Yet, remarked
the dissenters, the majority's conception of the interest in clarity
suggested that whenever police convince the trier of fact that they
followed72the required Miranda ritual, the police presumably will
prevail. 1
82. The dissent noted that the Escobedo Court also had remarked, " '[i]f the exercise of
constitutional rights will thwart the effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then
there is something very wrong with that system.' "Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1160-61 (Stevens,
J., dissenting) (quoting Escobedo, 387 U.S. at 490). The dissent also emphasized that in
Miranda, the Court had determined that the accusatorial nature of the American criminal justice system provides that individuals have the absolute right to refuse to respond to
police questioning and to have counsel during questioning. Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1161
(Stevens, J., dissenting). Finally, the dissenters recalled that in Dunaway the Court held
that the police have no right to take an individual into custody for the purpose of interrogating him unless they have probable cause for arrest. Id. at 1161 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
165. Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1161 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1162-63 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 1162 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1163 (Stevens J., dissenting).
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The dissent next discussed the majority's holding that the police's treatment of Burbine and his attorney had not deprived
Burbine of his right to counsel under the sixth amendment. 7 3 Justice Stevens began by stating that under principles of agency law,
the police deception of Burbine's attorney was tantamount to deception of Burbine himself.17 4 Furthermore, the dissent concluded
that Burbine's attorney was entitled to a truthful answer when she
made inquiries as to the status of her client. 7 5 In the dissent's
view, the misinforming of Burbine's attorney prevented the presence of counsel at the subsequent interrogation, thereby depriving
Burbine of his right to have an attorney present during
questioning.'76
Justice Stevens concluded the dissent by discussing Burbine's
claim that the police conduct had violated the fundamental fairness
requirement of the due process clause.' 77 In contrast to the majority's conclusion that the deception of Burbine's attorney had not
been so egregious as to rise to the level of a due process violation,
the dissent found that "police interference in the attorney-client
relationship [was] the type of governmental misconduct on a matter of central importance to the administration of justice that the
173. See supra notes 140-48 and accompanying text.
174. Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1163 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In support of this contention
Justice Stevens remarked that in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), the Court had
held that a suspect had "effectively asserted his right to counsel by having secured attorneys at both ends of the automobile trip, both of whom, acting as his agents, had made
clear to the police that no interrogation was to occur during the journey." Moran, 106 S.
Ct. at 1163 n.49 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
175. Moran, 106 S.Ct. at 1163 (Stevens, J., dissenting). During oral argument, the
Solicitor General, as amicus curiae, had suggested that the Miranda requirement that
suspects be informed of their right to the presence of an attorney during interrogation is
"a sort of white lie" because "police do not have to provide a lawyer if [a suspect] asks for
a lawyer. They need simply terminate interrogation." Transcript of Oral Arg. at 21.
The majority had taken the position that misinforming Burbine's attorney did not violate the fifth amendment right to counsel because that right is personal to the suspect.
Moran, 106 S.Ct. at 1147 n.4. According to the majority, the police deception similarly
did not violate the sixth amendment right to counsel because adversary proceedings had
not yet commenced when Burbine was interrogated. Id. at 1147. The dissenters sharply
criticized these holdings for suggesting that police may properly deny counsel access to a
client who is in custody even when the suspect has requested an attorney. Id. at 1164
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
176. Moran, 106 S.Ct. at 1163-64 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent declined to
specify whether this right to the presence of counsel during interrogations occurring prior
to the formal charging of the suspect stems from the fifth or sixth amendment: "Whether
the source of [the right to the presence of counsel during interrogation] is the Sixth
Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, or a combination of the two is of no special importance, for I do not understand the Court to deny the existence of the right." Id.
177. Id. at 1163-64 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Due Process Clause prohibits."' 78

IV.

ANALYSIS

A. The PrivilegeAgainst Compelled Self-Incrimination
A rule precluding a valid waiver of a suspect's Miranda rights
when police have failed to inform the suspect of an attorney's efforts to represent him, would provide protection against compelled
self-incrimination beyond that which is available under the existing
warning and waiver requirements.' 79 Without disputing this
fact, 8 ° the Moran majority held that a suspect not informed of his
attorney's availability still can knowingly and intelligently waive
his privilege against self-incrimination because the withholding of
such information does not affect the suspect's capacity to understand the nature of his rights and the consequences of their relinquishment.'
The Moran majority, however, failed to recognize
the fundamental difference between the abstract right to counsel
communicated through a police officer's recital of the Miranda litany, and the concrete right to the assistance of a particular lawyer
who presently is available and seeking to represent the suspect. A
suspect who is willing to waive the abstract right may not be willing to waive the concrete right.'8 2 Consequently, a suspect's
waiver of his abstract right to counsel should not be deemed sufficient to waive the concrete right to consult with an attorney presently available and seeking to render assistance. When an attorney
has attempted to represent a suspect in custody, there should be no
finding of valid waiver unless the suspect has been informed of his
83
attorney's efforts.1

Although state courts are bound by Moran's limited interpretation of the fifth amendment, they may interpret state constitutional
guarantees against compelled self-incrimination to extend greater
protection than that afforded by the fifth amendment. 8 4 A rule
precluding a valid waiver of Miranda rights where police have
failed to inform the suspect of his attorney's communications
178. Id. at 1165. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
179. See supra notes 54-72 and accompanying text.
180. Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1143.
181. See supra notes 122-29 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
184. Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1145 ("Nothing we say today disables the States from
adopting different requirements for the conduct of its employees and officials as a matter
of state law."). See also People v. Houston, No. Crim. 23713 (Cal. Oct. 2, 1986) (LEXIS,
States library, Cal file); People v. Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 484, 348 N.E. 2d 894, 898, 384
N.Y.S.2d 419, 422 (1976).
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would not only augment the privilege against self-incrimination,
but it would also discourage unethical police interference in attorney-client relationships. 85 For these reasons, it is recommended
that state courts interpret state constitutional guarantees against
compelled self-incrimination to require that police not only advise
suspects of their Miranda rights, but also that they inform suspects
of their attorneys' communications. 186 Failure by the police to
so inform a suspect should preclude a finding of valid waiver,
thereby necessitating the exclusion of statements obtained after police have neglected to inform the suspect of his attorney's
communications. 187
B.

The Right to the Assistance of Counsel and the Integrity of
the Attorney-Client Relationship

The Moran majority rejected the notion that police interference
with an attorney's efforts to represent a suspect in custody violates
the sixth amendment. 188 This holding appears to be consistent
with the Court's settled view that the sixth amendment right to
counsel does not attach until after the first formal charging proceeding. 189 It is, however, difficult to comprehend how the mere
filing of a charging document is relevant to the question of whether
185. The Moran majority stated that police interference in attorney-client relationships that takes the form of" 'deliberate or reckless' withholding of information [from
the suspect] is objectionable as a matter of ethics." Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1142. The American Bar Association also has indicated that police interference with an attorney's efforts
to represent a suspect in custody is improper. See supra notes 82-90.
186. The only state constitution that does not contain a provision guaranteeing the
privilege against compelled self-incrimination is that of New Jersey. Although not written into the New Jersey Constitution, the privilege against compelled self-incrimination is
firmly established as part of New Jersey's common law. See, e.g., In re Ippolito, 75 N.J.
435, 383 A.2d 117 (1978). The privilege also has been incorporated into the New Jersey
Rules of Evidence. N.J.R. EViD. 23(1), N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-17 (1976).
The California Supreme Court has already held that police are prohibited from keeping
suspects ignorant about their attorneys' communications as a matter of state constitutional law. People v. Houston, No. Crim. 23713 (Cal. Oct. 2, 1986) (LEXIS, States library, Cal file). In Houston, police had held the defendant incommunicado and had
deliberately neglected to inform him that an attorney retained by friends on the defendant's behalf was at the police station attempting to consult with him. Id. The defendant
had subsequently waived his rights and made a statement. Id. The Court held that the
police conduct had violated the defendant's Miranda rights as they apply in the context
of the state constitutional privilege against compelled self-incrimination. Id. (citing CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 19). The Houston Court concluded that the failure by the police to
inform the defendant of his lawyer's presence had vitiated the defendant's waiver and had
rendered inadmissible any statements made after the lawyer's arrival at the police station.
Id.
187. See supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text,
188. Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1145.
189. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
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counsel's presence at a pretrial interrogation is necessary to protect
the defendant's sixth amendment right to effective assistance of
counsel at trial. The sixth amendment is designed to provide an
individual with the aid of an attorney when he confronts the
prosecutorial forces of society. 190 Irrespective of whether the
charging instrument has been formally filed, one can hardly imagine an instance when the prosecutorial forces more press an individual than during custodial interrogation. These observations
suggest that the purposes of the right to the assistance of counsel at
trial would not be thwarted by expanding the scope of that protection to safeguard the integrity of the attorney-client relationship
prior to the initiation of formal charges. Accordingly, it is suggested that the constitutional right of defendants to the assistance
of counsel for their defense should be read to mandate a narrow
rule prohibiting deliberate or careless police interference with existing attorney-client relationships, whether or not adversary judi-

cial proceedings have commenced. 19'
Again, while states are bound by the Supreme Court's interpretation of the scope of the sixth amendment, they are free to interpret state constitutional guarantees of the right to counsel more
broadly than the Supreme Court has interpreted the sixth amendment. 92 If the individual states were to expand the protection af190. See supra note 50.
191. This rule was first suggested by the Miranda Court in dicta. Miranda, 384 U.S.
at 465-66. The Miranda Court indicated that the sixth amendment is violated when police prevent an attorney from consulting with his client. Id.
Under the suggested rule, courts will have to determine whether an attorney-client
relationship existed at the time of the challenged police interference. Contrary to the
assertions of the Moran majority, however, determining the existence of an attorney-client relationship does not present great difficulty. The point at which an attorney-client
relationship is established has traditionally been determined by principles of agency and
contract law. ABA/BNA LAWYER'S MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 31:101.
Generally, the relationship is formed by the express agreement of the lawyer to represent
the client or when the lawyer is consulted, advised of the facts underlying the claim, and
agrees to take the case or renders advice to the client. Id. Under simple agency principles, the fact that the lawyer has been retained by a person other than the client, as in the
Moran case, should not preclude a finding that an attorney-client relationship exists.
192. See Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1145. Every state constitution guarantees criminal
defendants the right to the assistance of counsel for their defense.
The California Supreme Court has previously extended the protection of that state's
constitutional right to counsel beyond the protection afforded by the sixth amendment to
the federal constitution. People v. Bustamante, 30 Cal.3d 88, 98-102, 177 Cal. Rptr. 576,
582-85, 634 P.2d 927, 932-35 (1981). In California, events which occur before formal
charging can nonetheless be "critical stages" of the prosecution. Id. Accusatory custodial
interrogations are such "critical stages." Id. Since the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Moran, the California Supreme Court has held that police conduct which is
calculated to interfere with an attorney's efforts to represent a suspect during custodial
interrogations conducted before formal charging, constitutes a denial of a California sus-
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forded by state constitutional provisions guaranteeing counsel to
criminal defendants so as to prohibit deliberate or careless police
interference with existing attorney-client relationships, Moran's
unfortunate result of sanctioning unethical police interference in
the attorney-client relationship would be avoided. Additionally,
under the proposed rule, the unethical practice of interrogating
represented individuals in the absence of and without the consent
of their attorneys would be terminated, thus sparing prosecutors
from having to break rules of professional ethics by introducing
statements elicited during improper interrogations of represented
individuals into evidence.'
C. Due Process Considerations
The Moran majority admitted that some forms of police deception might violate the fundamental fairness requirement of due
process.' 9 4 Yet, the majority concluded, without discussion, that

neither police failure to inform a suspect of his attorney's availability, nor police deception of the suspect's attorney regarding plans
to interrogate the client are sufficiently egregious forms of deception to offend due process.' 95 The Moran Court's conclusion in
this regard is thoroughly unconvincing. In the past, the Court has
consistently recognized the great value of counsel's presence during custodial interrogation to protect the constitutional right
against compelled self-incrimination and the right to effective
assistance of counsel at trial.' 9 6 Furthermore, both the courts and
the legal profession have expressed strong disapproval of police interrogation of represented suspects without the knowledge or consent of the suspect's counsel. 197 The vital importance of counsel's
assistance during custodial interrogation to the protection of constitutional rights, together with the strong public policy against direct communication with represented adverse parties, indicates
that the fundamental fairness requirement of the federal due process guarantee supports a rule prohibiting at least some forms of
police interference with attorneys' efforts to represent suspects in
custody. Under the Court's flexible approach to due process adjupect's Miranda right to counsel, and also of his independent state constitutional right of
access to counsel at "critical stages" of the proceedings against him. People v. Houston,
No. Crim. 23713 (Cal. Oct. 2. 1986) (LEXIS, States library, Cal file).
193. See supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
194. Moran, 106 S. Ct. at 1147.
195. Id. at 1147-48.
196. See supra notes 35-61 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 82-92 and accompanying text.
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dication, government practices that are inconsistent with fundamental principles of liberty and justice are constitutionally
prohibited.'9 8 Police interference with an attorney's efforts to represent his client during custodial interrogation-a time at which
the client's life and liberty are on the line, and at which the client
may be most in need of counsel-is offensive to our system of civilized justice and, therefore, should be condemned under the due
process clause.
An alternative to the adoption of per se rules, based on the privilege against self-incrimination or the right to counsel, that would
require police to inform suspects of their attorneys' communications, would be the adoption of a rule, based on due process principles, that would require the exclusion of statements obtained
during custodial interrogation when police have interfered with efforts by the suspect's attorney to represent his client, at least where
the police conduct is facially unconscionable. In order to determine whether the police interference is sufficiently egregious to offend due process, courts should consider factors such as whether
the interference was deliberate or inadvertent; whether the suspect
initially requested counsel but later waived this right by initiating a
generalized discussion of his case with the police; whether the suspect has been allowed to communicate with friends and family; and
whether the attorney actually came to the police station and was
there denied access to the suspect, as opposed to merely telephoning with a request that the suspect not be questioned in the attorney's absence. 99 Although the Moran opinion appears to allow for
the recommended exclusionary rule on the basis of the federal constitution's due process guarantee, state constitutional due process
provisions are also available to serve as the basis for the recommended rule.2 "
D.

Ethical Considerations

As Moran graphically illustrates, law enforcement authorities
are not bound by a judicially enforceable code of ethics. Yet, the
Moran majority expressed "distaste" for the practice of deceiving a
198. See supra notes 9-20 and accompanying text.
199. The recommended approach for determining whether police interference in the
attorney-client relationship violates due process is similar to the Court's due process "totality of the circumstances" test for determining whether a confession was voluntary. See
supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
200. The only state constitution that does not contain a provision guaranteeing due
process of law is that of Oregon. The right to due process of law in Oregon exists exclusively by virtue of the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution. See State ex rel
Jones v. Crookham, 296 Or. 735, 681 P.2d 103 (1978).
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suspect's attorney2"' and viewed the practice of withholding infor'20 2
mation from suspects as "objectionable as a matter of ethics.

Unfortunately, strict adherence to the letter of Moran will permit
objectionable and unethical practices of the police to flourish.
Under the suggested rule, police officers would no longer be encouraged to lie and scheme in order to keep attorneys from their
clients. Moreover, the unethical practice of interrogating represented individuals in the absence of and without the consent of
their attorneys would be terminated, thus sparing prosecutors from
having to break rules of professional ethics by introducing statements elicited during improper interrogations of represented individuals into evidence.20 3
V.

IMPACT

The Moran majority admitted that the failure to inform a suspect of his attorney's communications and/or the misinforming of
an attorney about plans to interrogate his client are, at the very
least, undesirable police practices. 2° Nonetheless, the Court found
these practices to be constitutionally permissible. The majority insisted that police are required to do no more than merely inform
suspects of their rights and, if counsel is requested, refrain from
interrogation until counsel is present. Accordingly, the Moran majority sanctioned the police practice of refusing attorneys access to
suspects, regardless of whether the right to counsel had been
invoked.20 5
Although due process guarantees afford some protection against
prolonged incommunicado detention, the permissible length of
such detentions under due process principles remains subject to the
discretion of lower court judges. 20 6 Regardless of the length of de-

tention, under the wholly subjective totality of the circumstances
test, prosecution-oriented judges can easily avoid finding due process violations in all but the most egregious cases.20 7 Consequently, the Moran Court has invited police to play a waiting game
with suspects in hopes of eventually securing a waiver-a game in
which the odds are stacked heavily in favor of the police.
If the suspect has requested counsel, the police cannot interro201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Moran, 106 S.Ct. at 1143.
Id. at 1142.
See supra notes 82-92 and accompanying text.
Moran, 106 S.Ct. at 1142-43.
See supra note 174.
See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text.
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gate him until counsel is present, though they can hold the suspect
incommunicado. 208 This incommunicado detention may in itself
exert pressure on the suspect to break his silence.20 9 If the suspect
maintains his silence long enough, the police may give up and allow the suspect access to his attorney. If, however, the suspect
eventually initiates conversation and thereby opens himself to interrogation, the police will have realized their objective.
When the suspect has not requested counsel but also has not
waived his rights, under Moran he may be detained without access
to counsel and interrogated freely, even if counsel is presently seeking access to his client.21 0 If the suspect is held incommunicado for
the elusive "long enough" period of time, a due process violation
might be found, rendering subsequent statements inadmissible.2t1
If, however, the suspect succumbs and gives a waiver or makes
incriminating statements the police, again, will have realized their
objective. In this regard, it is interesting to note that the defendant
in Moran initially refused to make any statement, but after five
hours of detention, changed his mind.
VI.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Moran majority specifically remarked that nothing in its
opinion precluded the states from adopting different requirements
for the conduct of their law enforcement officials as a matter of
state law.212 Prior to Moran, the New York Court of Appeals had
relied on state constitutional guarantees of the privilege against
self-incrimination, the right to the assistance of counsel, and due
process of law in holding that once an attorney has entered criminal proceedings on the defendant's behalf, the defendant in custody
may not validly waive his right to counsel in the absence of his
attorney. 1 3 To prevent police officers from deliberately scheming
to keep attorneys from their clients, other states should adopt rules
similar to the New York rule. State constitutional provisions guaranteeing the privilege against compelled self-incrimination, the
right to counsel, and due process of law, supply sound bases for
208. Once a suspect has invoked his right to counsel, he cannot be interrogated by the
police until counsel has been provided "unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police." Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S.
477, 485 (1981) (emphasis added).
209. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
210. See supra note 174.
211. See supra notes 15-32 and accompanying text.
212. Moran, 106 S.Ct. at 1145.
213. See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
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requiring the exclusion of statements obtained from a suspect during custodial interrogation where police have interfered with efforts
by the suspect's attorney to represent his client.2 14 Additionally,
the judiciary is not the only institution which can prevent police
officers from obstructing the attorney-client relationship. Law enforcement offices and prosecutors' offices, recognizing that the adversarial system embraces an unobstructed right to an attorney,
should implement internal policies which require police to inform a
suspect of his attorney's efforts to contact him. Furthermore, state
legislatures also should impose statutory duties on law enforcement officers to inform suspects when attorneys attempt to reach
them.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court long has recognized that criminal defendants may need legal representation at pretrial stages of the criminal
process in order to ensure effective assistance of counsel at trial.
The Court also has recognized that counsel's presence during custodial interrogation is a valuable protective device to ensure that
statements made during custodial interrogation are not the product
of compulsion. Despite these considerations, the Moran Court refused to adopt a constitutional rule requiring police to allow attorneys prompt access to suspects in custody. As a result, the Moran
decision has sanctioned unethical practices by law enforcement officers. Opportunity for reform rests with the individual states
which must adopt rules to protect the integrity of the attorneyclient relationship from unethical police interference. Although
rules prohibiting police from interfering with attorneys' efforts to
represent suspects might occasionally hinder efficient law enforcement, courts and legislatures should bear in mind that "[n]o system worth preserving should have to fear that if an accused is
permitted to consult with a lawyer, he will become aware of, and
exercise, these rights."2 '5
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